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MEXICO 



AND THE 

\ 



MONROE DOCTRINE. 



MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, 

> AND 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 



The author of these pages, an American citizen sincerely devoted to 
the welfare, and jealous of the honor of his native country, has had no 
object in view in composing them other than to ascertain, as fully and as 
impartially as possible, the exact truth in regard— First, To the present 
position of Mexico ; secondly, To the precise force of the Monroe Doc- 
trine; and thirdly, To the resultant duty and interest of the United 
States, as the natural champion of the Monroe Doctrine, and as the Great 
Power most nearly to be affected by the welfare or the misfortunes of 
Mexico. 

To all his fellow-citizens in positions of public trust and responsibility 
he respectfully offers the fruits of his investigation into these three cardi- 
nal points. 



/ 



MEXICO AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 



It is almost equally undesirable for a great nation "such as 
the United States*, either on the one hand, to trifle with a seri- 
ous invasion of its interests and its honor ; or, on the other, to 
plunge into war upon insufficient provocation. 

To treat the Imperial Government actually established in 
Mexico as an affront offered to our national dignity, and as a 
peril to our welfare, is such a course of policy as must neces- 
sarily lead to one of two issues. 

I. We shall degrade ourselves and damage our national pres- 
tige by a silly and obstinate refusal to recognize existing facts, 
and by reenacting toward the party or faction of the republi- 
cans in Mexico the semi-tragical farce played by Spain toward 
the party or faction of the Bourbonists in Italy after the con- 
solidation of the peninsula under the authority of Victor Em- 
manuel. 

II. We shall bring ourselves violently into collision with 
Maximilian and with France. 

In either event, the material interests of the American peo- 
ple must certainly suffer ; in the first case, both by the partial 
interruption and the non-development of our commercial re- 
lations with Mexico, as well as by the uncertainty which a 
" pouting " public policy always introduces into the financial 
calculations of men of business : in the second case, by the en- 
ormous burden which a war with the first military Power of 
Europe must impose upon the resources of the Republic at the 
critical period when capital and industry are seeking to resume 
their normal activity throughout the land. « 

By what necessity, therefore, are we compelled into accept- 



6 

ing one or the other of these alternatives ? If by no such ne- 
cessity at all, how terrible is the responsibility assnmed by 
those who, whether honestly or dishonestly, whether for the 
sake of winning a partisan triumph, or of asserting what they 
erroneously regard as a great principle of our national life, keep 
insisting upon it that such a necessity does constrain us in this 
matter of the Mexican Question ? 

If Maximilian" I. succeeds in establishing an Imperial Gov- 
ernment in Mexico without our recognition, a persistence in 
the " drifting" policy hitherto pursued by us toward him will 
expose us to ridicule as well as to material loss. 

If we undertake to expel Maximilian by force of arms, hav- 
ing no moral right to do so, and no material interest of a kind 
which it comports with our national character to entertain, we 
go into a great war, which is always a game of uncertain issue, 
upon insufficient grounds. 

Let us consider then : 

I. "What the " Monroe Doctrine " really affirms and was 
meant to affirm. 

II. What the nature of the French intervention in Mexico 
really is. 

III. What the history of republicanism and imperialism in 
Mexico itself has been. 

t 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 

The " Monroe Doctrine" was laid down by President Mon- 
roe in his annual message to Congress of December second, 
1823 : 

" It was stated, at the commencement of the last session, 
that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal, to 
improve the condition of the people of those countries, and 
that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary modera- 
tion. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, 
so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of 
events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so 
much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we 
have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citi- 



7 



zens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly 
in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that 
side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in 
matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, 
nor does it comport with onr policy so to do. It is only when 
our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent in- 
juries or make preparations for our defense. With the move- 
ments in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immedi- 
ately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all 
enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of 
the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from 
that of America. This difference proceeds from that which 
exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of 
our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood 
and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most en- 
lightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexam- 
pled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, 
to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the 
United States and those powers, to declare that we should con- 
sider any attempt on their part to extend their system to anv 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety e 
With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But 
with- the governments who have declared their independence 
and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great 
, consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could 
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, 
or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any Euro- 
pean power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an 
unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war 
between those new governments and Spain, we declared our 
neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have 
adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall 
occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of 
tins' Government, shall make a corresponding change on the 
part of the United States indispensable to their security." 

The next year, in his message of December seventh, 1824, 
President Monroe felt it to be his duty to repeat these decla- 
r ations, though in a milder form and modified tone. 



8 



" With respect to the contest to which our neighbors are a 
party, it is evident that Spain, as a power, is scarcely felt in 
it. These new States had completely achieved their inde- 
pendence before it was acknowledged by the United States, 
and they have since maintained it with little foreign pressure. 
The disturbances which have appeared in certain portions of 
that vast territory have proceeded from internal causes, which 
had their origin in their former governments, and have not 
been thoroughly removed. It is manifest that these causes are 
daily losing their effect, and that these new States are settling 
down under governments, elective and representative in every 
branch, similar to our own. In this course we ardently wish 
them to persevere, under a firm conviction that it will 23romote 
their happiness. In this, their career, however, we have not 
interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute 
for themselves a government which, in their judgment, may 
suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good ef- 
fect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent judges, 
and to their judgment we leave it,- in the expectation that 
other powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest 
which we take in their independence, which we have acknowl- 
edged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident there- 
to, especially in the very important one of instituting their own 
governments, has been declared, and is known to the world. 
Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, 
we can have no concern in the wars of the European govern- 
ments, nor in the causes which' produce them. The balance 
of power between, into whichever scale it may turn in its va- 
rious vibrations, can not affect us. It is the interest of the 
United States to preserve the most friendly relations with 
every power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to 
all. But, in regard to our neighbors, our situation is differ- 
ent. It is impossible for the European governments to inter- 
fere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to,, which are 
vital, without affecting us ; indeed, the motive which might 
induce such interference, in the present state of the war be- 
tween the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to 
be equally applicable to us." 

In these messages we have the text of the famous Monroe 
Doctrine. 



9 



What, now, was the force intended to be given to this doc- 
trine by its author, the Chief Magistrate of the Union ? 

When President Monroe spoke of the attempt to extend to 
America the system of European institutions as " unfriendly 
to the United States," did he mean that this consisted in the 
efforts actually made at this time by Spain to recover an au- 
thority which she was losing over American populations re- 
cently constituted into republics ; or in the possible establish- 
ment of a monarchy in the New World, even though that 
monarchy should be independent, and should be endowed with 
representative institutions ? In other words, was the doctrine 
of President Monroe aggressive or defensive in character ? 
Clearly defensive. To be sure of this, we need only consider 
the political circumstances under which it was uttered. 

These are : 1. The conduct of Spain in regard to her former 
American colonies, from 1814 to 1819. 2. The formation of 
the Holy Alliance. 3. The position of the United States in the 
time of Monroe. 

Upon the accession of Joseph Bonaparte to the throne of 
Spain, her American colonies imitated the mother country. 
They rose in arms. As Joseph had neither ships nor harbors, 
and controlled only the interior provinces, the old relations 
were soon suspended between Spain and the New World. 
Merchants of Glasgow, Liverpool, and London availed them- 
selves of this state of things to secure new markets for English 
commerce, then greatly straitened by the continental blockade. 
They flooded Spanish America with English goods. A little 
later, when the Cortes met at Cadiz, the British Government 
tried to legalize and confirm these new commercial relations. 
But the jealous, selfish policy which had always controlled the 
intercourse of Europe with the colonies was dear to the insur- 
gent Cortes, which systematically rejected every proposition 
likely to affect the traditional Spanish monopoly of the New 
World. This greed was to cost Spain dear. Ere long, Carac- 
cas, Chili, Buenos Ayres, and Mexico, sustained and stimulated 
zealously by the Cabinet of London, had passed from a declared 
separation from the crown of King Joseph into a downright 
declaration of independence. 

Such was the state of things when Ferdinand YIL, after 



10 

the abdication of Fontainebleau, was restored to the throne of 
his ancestors. This prince found the social and political order 
which he represented in a very different condition from that 
in which he had left it six years before. The enormous re- 
sources once drawn by Spain from America no longer fed the 
treasury, and Ferdinand soon concentrated his policy upon 
the single object of recovering these resources. 

As his only offensive weapons were a few worn-out men- 
of-war, insufficiently equipped, and a handful of demoralized 
troops, the only result of his first efforts was to excite fresh 
passions against his government. The liberated colonies re- 
taliated upon him most audaciously, sending their privateers 
to capture Spanish ships in the ports of Spain herself. Final- 
ly, after five years of fruitless efforts, Ferdinand raked together 
all the disposable funds of the state, issued a forced loan of 
three millions of dollars, and, toward the end of 1819, got to- 
gether sixteen or seventeen thousand soldiers around Cadiz for 
an American expedition. The result is well known. Germs 
of discontent, till then scattered through Spain, broke forth 
openly among the troops, and the Spanish Revolution began, 
to be crushed, not long afterward, by the Holy Alliance. 

Allusions to these events are numerous in President Mon- 
roe's message of 1823. Seeing the Spanish Americans threat- 
ened by Spanish dreams of a restored sovereignty, the Presi- 
dent sought to dissipate those dreams, and thus to aid the 
consolidation of the new republics. These republics had been 
recognized by the United States in 1822 — just so soon (says 
Mr. Monroe) as there ceased to be any doubt as to the fact of 
their independence, and as to the folly of the hopes of restora- 
tion cherished by a beaten and desperate government. 

Mr. Monroe does not oppose the general system of colonies 
and European dependencies actually existing in America, but 
simply the attempts of the mother country u23on " governments 
which have declared and maintained their independence." 

" In the war between these new governments and Spain," 
he says, " we have declared our neutrality. This we shall 
maintain until there shall be some change, necessitating on 
our part also a change indispensable to our security." 

Now, what, according to Monroe, is this possible " change ?" 



11 



It is the violent re incorporation, under Spanish authority, of 
the definitely established, recognized and constituted Southern 
republics. Hence, for the United States to have just cause of 
interference in the affairs of a neighboring people, this people 
must have thrown off the colonial yoke, proclaimed and main- 
tained its independence, and be in existence as a regular gov- 
ernment. These declarations fix the meaning of the Monroe 
Doctrine, and determine the eventualities, which, in the eyes 
of the President, would make it possible and proper to apply it. 

It will have been observed, that, whenever Moneoe speaks 
of the European Powers, he alludes to them by the phrase, 
" the allied Powers." This phrase shows what thought, in 
truth, it was, which filled the mind of the President in regard 
to Europe. This was his anxiety about the " Holy Alliance," 
which had daily grown in its pretensions since 1814, and in 
1823 had reached its apogee. 

The " Alliance" had been formed, according to itself, first, 
to protect the independence of peoples and of states, and to 
beat down the spirit of domination and conquest in the per- 
son of Napoleon. In 1818, the contracting Powers had 
renewed their alliance in the secret treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle 
for the purpose of resisting the spirit of revolution. ~ In 1820, 
upon the first outbreaks in Naples, they had proclaimed im- 
mobility as the law of monarchical Europe. 

An occasion was soon found to apply these principles. The 
rising in Naples and Piedmont gave Austria her long-sought 
pretext for action. She intervened in the north and in the 
south of Italy for the glory of monarchical right. But she 
did not propose to stop here. She desired a formal indorse- 
ment of intervention as a principle. The conferences of Lay- 
bach, opened January eighth, 1821, resulted in an open col- 
lective declaration of the three Northern Courts, that " the 
world, and good men in all lands, would always find in their 
union a sure guarantee against disturbers of the public 
peace." 

Let us add, that neither France nor England threw any 
weight of liberal policy, so far as Europe was concerned, 
against this exaggerated revival of divine right. The British 
Cabinet, indeed, declared, that the organic laws of Great 



12 

Britain refused to sanction either^the right of intervention or 
treaty which claimed for the allied courts an incontestable 
supremacy inconsistent with the independence and the rights 
of other States ; but it fully admitted that other Powers, and 
in especial Austria and the Italian Courts, might be in a 
different position, and that consequently England had no mind 
to interfere with any measures which Austria and the Italian 
Courts might think best for their safety to adopt. 

As to France, she first affirmed an absolute neutrality ; but 
soon threw off all scruples, and herself intervened in Spain to 
strike down the constitutional government, under the pretense 
that it was an attack on the principle of legitimacy, and in 
obedience to j the^mission confided to her by the Northern 
Courts. 

All this took place in 1823, a few months before Monroe's 
message was sent in. 

Now all these facts were brought under the President's eye 
by the British Minister Canning, when he drew up this famous 
" doctrine." He saw all Europe in the power of the " Holy 
Alliance." He had reason to fear that it might, ere long, 
maintain the pretensions of certain sovereigns in the New 
World. 

" How far," he asks, " is this principle of intervention to be 
applied ? This is a question which interests all independent 
Powers and all governments which differ from those of Europe, 
even the most remote, and none certainly more than the United n 
States." Again : " I informed you at the beginning of the 
last session, that a great effort was preparing in Spain and 
Portugal to ameliorate the condition of both countries, and 
that the attempt seemed to be marked by extreme moderation.* 
I need not observe to yon how greatly the result has differed 
from all expectations." (Message of December second, 1823.) 

This will show us how much light the events then actually 
happening in Europe threw upon the message of 1823. The 
efforts of Spain against her emancipated colonies, the move- 
ments of the " Holy Alliance," intervening with the sword of 



* The French royalist Minister Villele was opposed to interference m'Spain, 
and in 1822, Louis XVIII. gave "satisfactory explanations" on this point. 



13 



France herself in behalf of the Spanish monarchy, at the very 
moment when the Spanish sovereign had identified himself 
with a succession of luckless attempts to re-subjugate the 
Spanish American republics ; the suggestion made by a British 
Minister to the American government ; these make up the 
determining facts which inspired the " Monroe Doctrine." 

Still a third point, however, deserves our attention, for it 
doubtless stimulated the President in his course. We mean 
the situation of the United States in 1823. 

The Union was far from having attained in 1823 its present 
degree of power. Not only did it then lack the moral force 
which public opinion everywhere gives to fre„e institutions to- 
day, but it could hardly be' regarded as absolutely beyond the 
reach of hostile attempts from the Western Courts. Scarcely 
nine years had elapsed since England- had invaded American 
soil, and captured Washington. - Toward the end of 1814, 
New-Orleans had been threatened, and it was only in January, 
1815, that the utter defeat of Packenham ended the war 
in a manner honorable to America. Monroe, as War Minister, 
had carried on this conflict, and with rare energy. He could 
not believe that he had made such melancholy effusion of 
blood forever impossible, and he might still apprehend that 
England would avail herself of any favorable opportunity for 
attacking the United States. "It is impossible," he said, 
"that the European governments should intervene in America 
on subjects which to the new States are matters of life and 
death, without affecting us. ... the motives of their 
intervention may one day apply to us." 

Such are the facts which determine the exact sense and 
bearing of the " Monroe Doctrine." Like most of our great 
statesmen, Monroe was a practical man, and had a clear and 
just perception of the condition of the Union. He saw, he 
felt the danger which he sought to avert ; but there was 
nothing in his nature or his genius to make him the author of 
a speculative doctrine, utterly without immediate or practical 
applications. He wished to defend free and independent 
States against attempts.which had become unjust ; he regarded 
the fortunes of the Union as bound up with respect for their 
institutions ; this was all that he said ; this all that he saw. 



14: 



To imagine that Monroe cherished any passionate prejudi- 
ces against Europe, is to forget, in the first place, that he had 
lived himself in Europe for long years, in the discharge of 
important diplomatic duties at London and Paris ; and in the 
second place, that, in speaking of the " Holy Alliance " and 
its acts, he uses a moderation and temperance of speech quite 
incompatible with the extreme inflexible theories attributed to 
him. 

The best commentary upon the Monroe Doctrine, however, 
is the foreign policy of the United States at the time of its 
publication. We find that the United States did not hesitate 
to recognize the Imperial Government of Iturbide, in Mexico 
or the Crown of Brazil ; and that they made no effort to stir 
up revolt in Cuba or in Canada. 

In all this the policy of the Union conformed to the declara- 
tions of the message of 1823 : " As to the existing colonies 
and dependencies of European powers, we have not intervened, 
nor will we intervene in their affairs." 

We have seen what the " Monroe Doctrine " affirms, and 
was meant to affirm. It is noteworthy in this connection that 
no American statesman, at the time of its promulgation, ever 
imagined it to possess the transcendent importance now sought 
to be assigned to it. Benton, in his remarkable work, A 
Thirty Years' View of the Working of the American Govern- 
me?it, from 1820 to 1850, passes over absolutely without no- 
tice this " Doctrine," which, as we are now gravely asked to 
believe, contains the very quintessential principles of our 
national dignity and safety ! 

II. 

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 

What took France into Mexico % What government did 
she find there ? and what government by the help of her arms 
there establish? These three questions should be sincerely 
and impartially examined into, that we may ascertain whether 
the Monroe Doctrine requires the United States to take hos- 
tile action against the French and the New-Mexican Empire. 

By the official documents, we learn that the French expedi-* 



15 



tion to Mexico was begun as a simple, legitimate act of 
defense. It is well known that for twenty-five years Mexican 
governments had been guilty not only of reported exactions 
and spoliations upon Europeans and their commerce, but of 
crimes against the life of foreign residents. England and 
Spain, also, had their grounds of complaint on these heads ; 
but France had seen her consular agent and her citizens in- 
sulted, and their claims treated with contumely. 

The French Government claims to have acted in this mat- 
ter with all possible forbearance, and to have exhausted all 
other means of redress before appealing to arms. To the first 
importunities of his creditors Juarez replied that the pacifica- 
tion of the country had left the finances in disorder. All who 
had lent money to the Mexican Government thereupon in- 
formed their respective governments of this serious condition 
of things, and asked protection. 

Nevertheless, as the disorder of the finances was real, 
France, England, and Spain allowed President Juarez to con- 
solidate the debt on condition that it should hereafter bear in- 
terest at a rate fixed by the lenders. The first rate fixed was 
held to be excessive, and it was lowered. Things were at this 
point, and no further trouble was anticipated, the arbitrators 
having treated the debtors with the greatest consideration. 
The first payment of interest fell due. Juarez, as before, 
refused to pay it, under the old pretext of "no funds," al- 
though he had shortly before received large sums of money 
destined to pay this interest. It was plainly out of the ques- 
tion to admit of this new plea of " impossible." The head of 
a State, still more than a private individual, must fulfill his 
pecuniary obligations, especially when their amount, though 
important to the creditors, is comparatively insignificant for 
the debtor. 

One of two things — either Juarez had no material means 
of honoring his signature, in which case he represented only 
an inadequate and even an imaginary government, or he did 
not mean to honor it ; in which case it was proper to punish 
him. Upon this the European governments broke off" all 
relations with him, and united to obtain redress. 

Such, in a few words, was the origin of the Mexican expe- 



16 



dition. It had but one object, the recovery of sums due to 
France, and security for French citizens. This is shown by 
the Convention of October thirty-first, 1861, which stands in 
permanent contrast to all stories of cessions of territory made 
to France. 

" The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek, 
in the employment of the measures of coercion now to be un- 
dertaken, any acquisition of territory, or other special advan- 
vantage." (Convention, Article 2.) 

Of course the Convention of 'October thirty-first, 1861, has 
no longer any diplomatic force, but the engagement entered 
into by France and her then allies is at least morally binding 
still. That it is so regarded by France may be properly in- 
ferred from the fact that France made no acquisition of terri- 
tory in Mexico after the withdrawal of her allies had left the 
whole expedition upon her shoulders, and the successes of the 
French army had made her mistress of the country. She 
might then have indemnified herself for her expenses. ' But 
as the French* Government was then wise enough to decline 
adding to the troubles of a distant costly expedition by annex- 
ation of territory, it is hardly probable that it would now un- 
dertake such annexations when they would only increase the 
embarrassments of the new Mexican Government. The sto- 
ries of an intended eventual cession of Sonora to France have 
been repeatedly and officially denied in France by the French 
■Government, and more recently in this country, and in the 
columns of the New-York press, by the agent of Maximilian. 

But to return to the European intervention. . The objects 
of this intervention were so clearly defined by the Convention 
of October thirty-first, 1861, that the United States were in- 
vited to join the Western Powers in insisting upon analogous 
claims of American citizens. 

It is true, that the United States refused to take part in the 
action of the European powers against Mexico. Beside the 
reasons given for the refusal, a sufficient motive to it existed 
in the then condition of the national struggle with the seced- 
ing States. Moreover, the " moral solidarity " which, by a 
principle very precious to this Government, unites the repub- , 
lies of the New World, imposed special duties of consideration 



17 



toward Juarez upon the United States Government, although 
it can not be contended that this " moral solidarity " goes to the 
extent of requiring us to uphold a republic which can neither 
uphold itself in the shape of order at home, nor of good faith 
abroad. 

But it is no part of the policy of the United States to treat- 
pecuniary 'questions as beneath the appeal to arms. On the 
contrary, the United Statespiave treated such questions always 
as of great importance in international relations. We need 
cite but one example, which goes back to the Presidency of 
Andrew Jackson and the French monarchy of July. 

The United States had long demanded indemnity for Amer- 
ican ships seized and confiscated under the decrees of Berlin 
and Milan. Napoleon I. had never admitted the justice of 
the claim. The "Restoration" had met it with evasive re- 
plies. Finally, in 1830, Mr. Rives, then United States Minister 
at Paris, seizing upon the opportunity afforded by the uncer- 
tainties of the new dynasty, got a treaty signed July fourth, 
1831, which fixed the indemnity at twenty-five million francs, 
payable in installments. The French Government, when it 
signed this treaty, forgot only one thing, to reserve to itself 
the right of ratification by the legislature. President Jack- 
son, having nothing to do with this, drew the first bill. 

The French Government asked the Chambers for the money 
to meet it. It was refused, and the draft went back protested. 
In his annual message (1834) President Jackson denounced 
the conduct of France in strong terms, and went so far as to 
propose that the United States should take the law into their 
own hands, and if the draft was not honored by the French 
legislature at its next session, that Congress should pass a law 
for the seizure of French property. 

" Since France," said the President, u in violation of the 
pledges given through her Minister here, has delayed her final 
action. so long that her decision will not probably be known in 
time to be communicated to this Congress, I recommend . that 
a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property, 
in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt 
at the approaching session of the French Chambers." 

This passage of history shows us how resolutely the United 
2 



18 



States can insist upon their pecuniary dues. And in more 
recent times the demand made upon England to indemnity 
American commerce for losses caused by the confederate cruis- 
ers built in England tends to the same point. 

The precedents set by ourselves thus compel us to admit 
that the French expedition to Mexico was undertaken legiti- 
mately, in fulfillment of the duty of protection, which all civ- 
ilized nations owe to their citizens against governments which 
imperil their interests or their safety. 

III. « 

IMPERIALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN 
MEXICO. 

The Western Powers went to Mexico, as we have seen, on 
no crusade referring to the domestic affairs of that country, 
But the offenses against the law of nations, for which they de- 
manded satisfaction from Juarez, brought out the fact that 
these offenses had their origin in the impotence, the malevo- 
lence, the incoherence of the authorities established under him 
in Mexico. When Monroe assured the new American repub- 
lics in 1823 of the protection of the United States, Ike gave as 
his reason that " t these new States were consolidated under 
elective and representative governments in all their branches," 
and that they were enjoying in peace all the benefits insured 
by such governments. 

Was this true of Mexico in 1861 ? 

The truth would appear to be that never had Mexico been 
given up so utterly and desperately to anarchy and civil con- 
fusion. Two governments de facto had for many months ex- 
isted, the one installed with Miramon" at Mexico, the other at 
Yera Cruz, with Juarez. France and England had offered 
their mediation to put an end to these deplorable dissensions, 
equally damaging to public law and to the rights of foreign 
residents. Having been accepted only by Miramon, the offer 
came to nothing, and Juarez, better served by his troops than 
his adversary, shortly after routed the. latter, and fixed himself 
in the capital. This, however, did not pacify the country. 
As is often the case, the beaten Miramon was still strong 
enough to attack his victorious rival. Juarez was master of 



19 



Mexico in his turn, but the lieutenants of Miramon retiring 
into the provinces, as Juarez had formerly done, overthrew 
his authority in one State after another. 

The troops of Juarez were even beaten in a combat near 
the City of Mexico itself. Yiolent measures taken by Juarez 
increased this confusion. 

The Envoys of^Spain, the Holy See, and G-uatimala were 
simultaneously expelled from the capital, on a charge of sym- 
pathy with Miramon. Needing money, the government of 
Juarez laid an arbitrary tax on fortunes, and incarcerated all 
who refused to pay it. In like manner the Church revenues 
were confiscated. Judicial officers assumed independent au- 
thority. An attempt being made to assassinate the French 
Envoy, the Mexican police gave him no protection. 

In short, the government at Mexico was but the shadow and 
name of a government, while it had ceased to be even a 
shadow outside of the capital, and it bore no sort of resem- 
blance to that orderly constitution of republican authority in 
which Monroe, in 1823, had taken so proper an interest. 

In this state of alfairs the Conservative party in Mexico 
availed itself of the presence of the French troops to consti- 
tute an imperial government, precisely as the Belgians, in 1831, 
availed themselves of a French intervention to complete their 
secession from Holland by establishing Leopold upon a consti- 
tutional throne ; or, as the people of the lesser Italian States, 
in 1859 and 1860, availed themselves of a French intervention 
to change their forms of government, and to incorporate them- 
selves fn a new and united Italy under Yictor Emmanuel. 

No man in his senses denies that both in Belgium and in 
Italy liberty and order were thus secured ; and if the future 
shall prove that liberty and order might also have been at 
once restored to unhappy Mexico, but for the encouragement 
given through' our mistake or our malevolence by ourselves to 
the men who have incessantly abused the name of liberty in 
that country to the destruction of order, our responsibility in 
the premises will not be a pleasant thing for our children to 
remember. Neither the idea of constituting an empire in 
Mexico, nor the choice of Maximilian of Austria for the throne, 
were originated by the French. When Mexico achieved her 
independence of Spain, her people, unlike our own, had en- 



\ 



20 

joyed no experience in self-government ; all their local tradi- 
tions were monarchical, just as all our local traditions were 
democratic ; and the first impulse of the truest Mexican pa- 
triots, with Hidalgo at their head, was to offer the independ- 
ent throne of Mexico to a Spanish prince. Still earlier, in- 
deed, it had been hoped, for a time, that Ferdinand, on the 
expulsion of his family by Napoleon I. from Spain, would 
accept an American monarchy from his American subjects ; 
in which case it is possible that Mexico might have pre- 
sented to-day to the world the same spectacle of order and 
prosperity which we see in Brazil, where, under the royal 
House of Braganza, ruling a constitutional empire, we find the 
American Portuguese richer, happier, and more considerable 
i^han the Portuguese of Europe. 

Republican institutions, which proved to ourselves the guar- 
antee of our prosperity, because they were rooted in our tra- 
ditions and habits as colonial freemen, proved to Mexico the 
source of unnumbered evils, because they were entirely with- 
out such roots in that country. Efforts were constantly made 
to shake them offj the first successful one being that which 
raised Itijebide to the throne. After his downfall and death, 
the monarchical party in Mexico did not cease to exist ; and 
its representatives sought everywhere for a prince whose origin 
might commend him to the traditions of the Mexican people, 
.while his personal character should offer a prospect of success 
in the difficult task of reducing to order a country exhausted 
by forty years of anarchy, ambition, and misrule. 

Descended from the great Spanish Emperor of Germany, 
Charles Y., Maximilian of Austria, so long ago as 1853, at- 
tracted the attention of the Mexican Imperialists. Then a 
youth of twenty-one, the Archduke had already given promise 
of that devotion to science and practical life which afterward 
gained for him a most creditable reputation during his service 
in the Austrian navy, as well as of the tact and political lib- 
erality which made him conspicuously odious to the despotic 
faction in Austria, during his administration of Austrian Italy, 
as Governor- General of Yenetia and Lombardy, in 1859. It 
is certain that the project' of aiding to reorganize society in 
Mexico was seriously suggested to Maximilian before his mar- 
riage, in 1857, with the daughter of Leopold, King of the Bel- 



21 



gians ; and it is absurdly unlikely that by bis father-in-law, 
the most liberal and sagacious ©f cotemporary monarchs, who 
defeated revolution in 1848 by simply offering to " pack his 
trunk and go " if the Belgians did not wish him to stay, Max- 
imilian - can have been encouraged to accept a throne not of- 
fered to him by the people themselves over whom he was to 
rule. 

To go no further back in Mexican history than the origin of 
the Constitution under which', by virtue of Art. 79, Section 
II., Title III., Jttabez claims to act as President of Mexico, 
the revolution of Ayutla, which gave the said Constitution to 
the country, is described in the Address of the " Constituent 
Congress to the Nation," as the result of a popular uprising 
"to throw off the yoke of the most ominous despotism." 
This " ominous despotism " being the fruit of a forty years' 
experiment at republicanism, who can be surprised that the 
most intelligent classes in Mexico should have wearied of the 
experiment? Things, not names, are the object of rational 
and practical men ; and liberty with order, under an Emperor, 
is certainly preferable to an " ominous despotism," even though 
it be baptized a " republic." 

This " revolution of Ayutla," which, in 1857, was to open for 
Mexico the way of return to " constitutional order," did noth- 
ing of the kind. " Ignacio Comonfort, Presidente Isunstituto 
de la Pepublica Mexicana," published the new Constitution 
with much solemnity from the National Palace at Mexico, 
February twelfth, 1857 ; but the ink with which it Was printed 
was hardly dry before the civil commotions began again, which, 
had Mr. Buchanan's administration chosen to avail itself of 
the offers made by one of the thence resulting Mexican " gov- 
ernments," might have given us a new and splendid Mexican 
province, to exasperate our sectional passions in 1860. A stop 
being put to all this confusion and anarchy by the presence of 
the French army, the Mexican imperialists naturally seized 
upon that favorable moment to try their own path to this 
"constitutional order," which forty successive republican 
presidents had sought for in vain. 

In his letter of July third, 1862, to Marshal Foeey, the 
Emperor Napoleon had said : " The object ' aimed' at is not 
to impose upon the Mexicans a form of government antipa- 



22 ■ 
j 

thetic to them, but to aid them in their efforts to establish a 
government which shall have some prospect of stability, and 
of assuring to France redress for the wrongs of which she com- 
plains." 

On the fall of Juarez, Almonte hastily set up a regency. 
This the French commander very properly declined to recog- 
nize, as the act of a single man without the popular authority, 
and an assembly of the Mexican notables, convening at Mex- 
ico, offered the crown of the empire to the Austrian Archduke 
Maximilian. This step was followed by the ayuntamientos, 
or local authorities, all over the country. The numbers repre- 
sented in this action are much greater than is commonly sup- 
posed. In March, 1864, a synoptical table was published of 
the populations which had then " adhered " to the empire. 
They amounted to 5,498, 58T> According to the " Geographi- 
cal and Statistical Society," the civilized population of all Mex- 
ico amounts to 8,629,982 souls. From which it appears that 
Maximilian has really been elected in Mexico by an immense 
majority of the people. 

The burden of proof to show that he is not, certainly rests 
upon the representatives of a President who confessedly has 
not been elected at all, and who has been driven into the ex- 
tremest corners of the Republic by a foreign force of about 
•twenty-five thousand men ! 

CONCLUSION. 

If now, in the first place, the " Monroe Doctrine," properly 
understood, does not require us either to interfere for the ex- 
pulsion of Maximilian from Mexico, or to refuse to recognize 
his "authority there ; and if, in the second place, the nature of 
the French intervention in that country in nowise affects our 
national honor, what material interest have we in prolonging 
the present unsatisfactory state of the " Mexican Question," 
or in resolving it openly into a fierce and destructive war ? 

For Mexico, as we have seen by the confession of the Mexi- 
can Republicans themselves, the Republic means anarchy. 
Are we to aim at Mexican annexation through Mexican an- 
archy % What thinking man can desire to see the area of the 
Republic extended beyond its present limits, while the ques- 

/ 



23 



tions still to be solved in oiir domestic policy retain the gravity 
which now belongs to them ? 

Our commerce with Mexico, in spite of the impulse recently 
given to it by the liberal policy of Maximilian toward Ameri- 
cans in general, languishes under the pressure of doubt and 
concern as to the future. What that commerce might be, 
what it ought to be, and what, with but a few years of peace 
in Mexico and of peaceful relations with ourselves, it must' 
become,- few people adequately appreciate. 

The following table, extracted from Mr. Carlos Butter- 
field's interesting treatise on " The United States and Mexico," 
published in 1861, is impressively eloquent upon this head : 



Av'age Av'age 

Country. Population. Imports. per Exports. per 

Capita. Capita. 

Mexico, 8,283,088 $26,000,000 $3.14 $28,000,000 $3.38 

Cuba, 1,449,462 39,560,029 27.29 46,792,055 32.28 

West-India Islands, 2,497,154 41,813,262 16.74 37,188,283 14.89 

Central America, 2,195,450 5,648,017 2.57 6,566,246 2.99 

South-America, 20,737,874 127,131,245 6.13 145,037,286 6.99 



Total Spanish America, . .35,163,028 $240,152,823 $6.82 $263,583,870 $7.49 

United States, 30,500,000 282,613,150 9.26 324,644,421 10.64 

Canada, 2,571,437 49,288,245 19.16 31,813,020 12.37 



From this table we may see how great a development the 
commerce of Mexico is capable of under favorable conditions. 

At the present moment the total commerce of Spanish 
America, (including in that term, for convenience sake, th'e 
Empire of Brazil also,) with a population not greatly larger 
than our own, is probably equal in value to the commerce of 
the United States. Was the commerce of Mexico developed 
in a ratio only equal to the general average of the Spanish 
American States, it would much more than double the amount 
here given. ' 

As we now see, it stands in the table above printed at a 
total — exports and imports taken together — of $6.52 per head 
of the population ; our own commerce standing at a total ot 
$19.90 per head of the population ; and the average of Span- 
ish America at $14.31 per head of the population. 

But Mexico, bounded on either shore by the ocean, with a 
singularly extended coast-line and many ports, combining 
within herself all the climates of the torrid and temperate 



24 



zones, enormously rich in mineral wealth, and possessing vast 
agricultural capabilities, ought to clev.elope a commerce far 
above the general average of the Spanish American States. 

What interest can we, then, as the nearest neighbors of 
Mexico, and the greatest commercial power of the ]STew World, 
have in Mexico and her affairs at all comparable to that in- 
volvedan such a pacification of the country as shall accelerate 
the natural development of its trade and commerce ? 

That it has already increased very greatly since the establish- 
ment of the Empire we know, on the authority of the Journal 
des Deficits, one of the most respectable journals in Europe, 
and eminent not only for its opposition to the general policy 
of ^Napoleon III., but for its particular hostility to the Mexi- 
can Expedition. 

We know, too, that a line of American steamers, running 
between New- York and Yera Cruz, and established no longer 
' ago than last summer, is aiready regarded as one of the most 
prosperous of the pioneer enterprises, which, it is hoped, may 
restore to the United States, at least in a measure, our lost 
position as a ship-owning and steamer-building people. 

Mr. Butteefield's tables were drawn up before the civil 
war. Since that time our own commerce has fallen off as 
rapidly as the commerce of France and England has increased, 
until from the second we have fallen to the third, and if we 
consider Germany as " one nation," to the fourth rank among 
commercial nations. When Mr. Butteefield wrote, we en- 
joyed less than one sixth of the foreign trade of Mexico, while 
Great Britain possessed more than one half of that trade! 
To-day, the disparity must unquestionably be much greater 
against ourselves, as will be evident when" we consider that 
the commerce of Peru — a country in all respects naturally in- 
ferior to Mexico, and cursed, like Mexico, though less incessant- 
ly, with revolutionary " republicanism" — rose from §16,880,377 
in 1853 to $62,500,000 in 1862 ; the United States gaining 
nothing, and Great Britain nearly sixty jper cent of this in- 
crease. 

How much longer must we persevere in a policy which 
thus sacrifices the permanent interests of mankind and the 
welfare of our own people to the dreams of visionaries, or the 
schemes of selfish and designing politicians ? 



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